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Senate Bill No. 235, which became effective September 7, 1957,
clarifies the meaning of the Ohio Assignment of Accounts Receivable
Statute in a significant respect. The Bill makes it clear that an assignee of
accounts receivable under a written assignment for value made at any
time within the effective period of a notice of assignment or notice of re-
newal is "protected" as to such accounts,1 even if the accounts arise under
a contract which was made after the filing of the applicable notice of as-
signment or notice of renewal.
The Bill makes very explicit what clearly appears to have been the
original intent of the statute which it amends.2 Ohio accounts receivable
legislation, since the passage of the 1941 statute, has been governed by
the principle of "notice filing." "Notice filing" requires the public
filing of a simple notice indicating that a specified person has entered or
contemplates entering a secured financing transaction or transactions
with another specified person. The public notice need not identify any
specific property as subjected or to be subjected to a security interest.
However, such a notice affords adequate protection to those dealing with
the assignor by notifying them that further inquiry into the assignor's
existing financing arrangements is required. The public notice required
to be filed under the Ohio Accounts Receivable Statute is termed a
"notice of assignment" and need set forth no facts other than that:
The undersigned assignor is assigning contemporaneously here-
with or intends to assign one or more accounts receivable to
the undersigned assignee.'
The period of effectiveness of a notice of assignment is three years after
the date of its filing, and this period may be extended for successive
three-year periods by the filing of "notices of renewal." 4
The principal advantage of notice filing in accounts receivable
financing lies in the convenience with which the parties to financing
"Of the Cleveland Bar.
1The rights of a "protected assignee' are set forth in OHIO REV. CODE
§§1525.04 and 1325.07.
2 See Folkerth, Accounts Receivable Legislation, 12 OHIo ST. L.J. 333 (1952),
commenting on the 1951 revision of the Ohio Assignment of Accounts Receivable
Statute:
As in the previous law, the notice is effective for all assignments of
accounts receivable which take place between the parties during the
three year period for which the original notice is effective.
3 OHIO REv. CODE §1325.01 (H).
4 OHio REv. CODE §1325.03.
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transactions may comply with the statutory requirements. Substantial
inconvenience and expense would be incurred by lenders and borrowers
were they required to file a separate notice each time an assignment of
one or more contract rights or accounts was made. The drafters of the
Uniform Commercial Code (which was one of the principal sources of
the 1951 revision of the Ohio statute) have stated in support of the
adoption of "notice filing" in the Code:
"Notice filing" has proved to be of great use in financing
transactions involving inventory, accounts and chattel paper,
since it obviates the necessity of refiling on each of a series of
transactions in a continuing arrangement where the collateral
changes from day to day.5
Despite the clear purpose of notice filing to eliminate the need to
refile a notice each time the collateral changes, a Texas appellate court
in 1951, in Keeran v. Salley,6 construed the Texas Assignment of Ac-
counts Receivable Statute (which adopts the system of notice filing)' as
limiting the scope of protection afforded by the publicly filed notice to
only those assigned accounts which arise under contracts which were in
existence at the time of the filing of the notice. The court based its
decision on an interpretation of the statutory definition of the term,
"account" or "account receivable." In the Texas statute this term was
defined in part to mean "an existing or future right to the payment of
money presently due, or to become due under an existing contract." ' The
court held that the point of time at which a contract must be "existing"
for an assignment of accounts arising thereunder to be protected is the
time of the filing of the statutory public notice. This holding, of course,
excluded from the coverage of the statute, assigned accounts arising
under contracts "existing" at the time of the assignment but made later
than the filing of the notice.
The decision in Keeran v. Salley seems clearly erroneous. Another
interpretation of the above-quoted definition, much more consistent with
the principle of notice filing on which the statute is based, is that the
phrase "rights under an existing contract" adopts the substantive common-
law rule followed by many American jurisdictions, including Texas,
that rights which may arise under contracts not already in existence at the
date of assignment cannot validly be assigned. 9 In other words, the
statutory requirement that rights much arise under "existing contracts"
to be protected might better have been construed in the Keeran case to
mean that statutory protection extends to rights assigned under contracts
5 Comment 2, UNIFOR,., COMMERCIAL CODE §9402.
6244 S.V. 2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
7Tax. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 260-1, §3(b) (Vernon, 1947).
8TEx. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 260-1, §1(1) (Vernon, 1947).
9See 31 TEXAs L. REv. 63 (1952). It is difficult to state with certainty
whether this substantive rule was followed by Ohio at common law. A dictum of
the Ohio Supreme Court recognized as prevailing the rule that wages which
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existing at the time of assignment whether or not such contracts were in
existence at the date of the filing of the statutory public notice. Under
the Keeran construction, the convenience of notice filing is destroyed
since the filing of a new public notice would be required every time the
lender took an assignment of rights arising under a contract entered since
the date of the last notice.
The decision not only destroys the convenience provided by notice
filing but does so without any corresponding benefit to third parties. The
system of filing which results from the Keeran decision is a strange blend
of notice filing and the type of filing required under chattel mortgage
acts. Notice filing provides convenience for borrower and lender by re-
quiring only infrequent filing of a general notice, but imposes on third
parties the duty of inquiring further as to what specific assets of the
borrower have already been collateralized. "Chattel mortgage" filing,
in requiring a filing each time new collateral is given and in requiring
the collateral to be identified in the public record, is less convenient for
borrower and lender, but spares third parties the duty of inquiry beyond
the public record. The system of filing resulting from the Keeran
decision burdens lender and borrower with a requirement of frequent
filing, but in requiring merely the continual refiling of the same general
notice of assignment provides third parties with no more information than
they would receive from one such notice.
The incorrectness of the court's decision is further indicated by the
provision of the Texas statute (paralleled by a provision of the 1951
Ohio statute) that the maximum period of effectiveness of a public notice
is three years."0 Since very few contracts under which accounts will
arise and be assigned are not completed within less than three years,
the length of the statutory period indicates that the public notice was
intended to protect assignment of rights under contracts entered sub-
sequent to the filing of the notice.11
might be earned under future employments, being a mere expectancy or possibility,
were not assignable at law. Rodijkeit v. Andrews, 74 Ohio St. 104, 116, 77 N.E.
747 (1906). See also Tolman v. Hyndman Steel Roofing Co., 6 Ohio N.P. 467
(1899). However, a later decision of the Supreme Court held that an assignment
of an expectancy by an heir apparent or presumptive, although not enforceable at
law, could be enforced in equity upon the death of the ancestor when the inherit-
ance had become absolute. Hite v. Hite, 120 Ohio St. 253, 166 N.E. 193 (1929).
It has been suggested in a subsequent appellate case that the Hite decision is of
general applicability in the law of assignments and, accordingly, modifies the rule
recognized in the Rodijkeit dictum. See Diehl v. Interstate Loan Co., 57 Ohio App.
532, 15 N.E. 2d 170 (1937).
10-TEx. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 260-1, §4.
11 See 4upra note 9, at 64. A peculiarly unfortunate aspect of the Keeran
decision is that it was completely unnecessary. The case could have been decided
on the ground that the assignment in question had not been made until after a
garnishment had attached to the funds which were the subject of the assignment.
The court in the Keeran case made no reference to the fact that the Federal
[Vol. is
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In 1955 the Texas legislature amended the Texas Assignment of
Accounts Receivable Statute to overcome the effect of the Keeran de-
cision.' 2 Since that action by the legislature, the Keeran decision has been
followed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Republic
National Bank v. Vial,'3 the operative facts of which case preceded the
effective date of the Texas amendment. The announcement of the Vial
decision caused concern in commercial and banking circles in several
states, including Ohio, whose assignment of accounts receivable statutes
contained wording similar to that which was construed so unfortunately
in the Texas cases. Recently, several of these states have amended their
statutes to rule out any possibility of their being construed as the Texas
statute was in the Keeran case.' 4 Senate Bill No. 235 was intended to
have this effect with respect to the Ohio statute.
Early last year a group of Ohio lawyers exchanged views as to
whether the Ohio Assignment of Accounts Receivable Statute was in
need of amendment to bar the possibility of a construction similar to that
made of the Texas statute in the Keeran case. It was the consensus of
this group that the statutory construction applied in the Texas cases was
incorrect; and that the term "existing contract," as used both in Texas
and Ohio statutes, incorporated the substantive rule that rights under
future contracts are not presently assignable.' 3 The group concluded,
however, that because of the need for absolute certainty in commercial
transactions, the Ohio statute should be amended to avoid the remotest
District Court for the Southern District of Texas had earlier held that a public
notice under the Texas statute protects all assignments made within its period of
effectiveness, regardless of whether any rights assigned arose under contracts
entered subsequent to the filing of the notice. In re Cumings, 99 F. Supp. 690
(S.D. Tex. 1951). The district court in the Cumings decision relied on certain
language in a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Second
National Bank v. Phillips, 189 F. 2d 115 (5th Cir. 1951). The Cumings decision
was eventually reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit subsequent
to the rendering of the Keeran decision, on grounds not here relevant. United
States v. Phillips, 198 F. 2d 634 (5th Cir. 1952). However, in passing, the Court
of Appeals noted that the view taken in the Cumings decision could no longer be
maintained in the face of the Keeran case, and further suggested that the reliance
of the district court on the earlier decision of the Court of Appeals in Second
National Bank v. Phillips, supra, had been unjustified.
12 Tex. Acts 1955, 54th Leg., c. 305, effective May 21, 1955.
13232 F. 2d 785 (5th Cir. 1956).
14 Colorado: Senate Bill No. 265, effective May 1, 1957; Florida: Fla. Acts
1957, c. 57-22, effective April 30, 1957; North Carolina: House Bill No. 340,
effective May 1, 1957; Ohio: Senate Bill No. 235, effective September 7, 1957;
Vermont: Vt. Acts 1957 No. 200, effective May 28, 1957.
See Moore and Kupfer, Factor's Liens and Accounts Receivable, 12 THE
BUSINE s LAWYER 482 (1957).
15 In Freedheim & Goldston, Article 9 and Security Interests in Accounts,
Contract Rights and Chattel Paper, 14 OHio ST. L.J. 69, 76 (1953), the term
"existing contract" in the 1951 Ohio Statute is interpreted as incorporating this
substantive rule.
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possibility that the Texas cases might be followed by Ohio courts in the
construction of the Ohio statute;"6 it prepared a draft of proposed
amendments to achieve this result. The text of this draft was sub-
stantially identical to that eventually approved by the General Assembly
as Senate Bill No. 235.
The Bill meets the problem of statutory construction presented by the
Keeran case directly by an amendment to Ohio Rev. Code § 1325.01 (A)
(1953), which defines the term "account receivable." This section, prior
to the amendment, read:
"Account receivable" means a right to the payment of
money for the performance of work or the rendering of
of services, or for the sale, lease, or other transfer of chattel
property, including both an existing right to immediate or
future payment and a right to payment which may arise under
an existing contract ...
It will be noted that this definition, like the definition in the Texas
statute considered in the Keeran case, does not explicitly state the point
of time at which rights or contracts under which rights may arise must be
"existing" in order to be within the definition. The amendment to this
section made -by Senate Bill No. 235 states specifically that the relevant
point of time is the time of assignment:
"Account receivable" means a right to the payment of
money for the performance of work or the rendering of
services, or for the sale, lease, or other transfer of chattel
property, including both a right to immediate or future pay-
ment existing at the time of the assignment thereof and a right
to payment which may arise under a contract existing at the
time of the assignment of such right ...
10 It may be that the Texas statute, as it read at the time of the Keeran
decision, is in some respects distinguishable from that of Ohio. Section 2 of the
Texas statute stated:
"The assignment of any account or accounts may be protected by the execution
and delivcery by the assignor to the assignee of an instrument . . . assigning such
account or accounts . . . and by the filing for record the 'Notice of Assignment'
as hereinafter provided for." (emphasis added)
And Section 3 thereof provided:
"Whenev'er any person, firm or corporation assigns within this state by in-
strument in writing all or any one or more of his accounts receivable, there may
be filed for record a 'Notice of Assignment' . . ." (emphasis added)
The language of the above sections, read in isolation, might suggest that the
statute required a separate filing of a notice each time the assignor assigned one
or more accounts. This result would, however, not correspond precisely to the
result of the Texas cases, which read the statute as requiring a new filing only
when the assignor assigns one or more accounts arising under a contract made
since the date of the filing of the last notice. In any event, since the Texas decisions
where based solely on the definition of "account receivable," which definition was
extremely similar to that in the Ohio statute, the group of lawyers considering the
matter concluded that it would be prudent to clarify the meaning of that definition
in the Ohio statute.
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The Bill makes a corresponding amendment to Ohio Rev. Code
§1325.04(A) (1953), which sets forth the conditions under which an
assignment of accounts receivable is protected. The first sentence of
this Section prior to the amendment read:
A written assignment for value, signed by the assignor,
becomes protected at the time the assignee, having previously
or contemporaneously filed a notice of assignment, takes such
assignment during the effective period of the notice.
That sentence has been amended by the Bill to read as follows:
An assignee of an account receivable is protected as to
such account receivable if the assignment thereof is made in
writing, for value, and during the effective period of an appli-
cable notice of assignment which has been filed previously to
or contemporaneously with the making of such assignment,
whether or not such account receivable or the contract under
which such account receivable may arise is in existence at the
time of the filing of the applicable notice of assignment.
In summary, Senate Bill No. 235 makes it clear that a notice of
assignment protects all written assignments for value made within the
effective period of the applicable notice. Under the Assignment of
Accounts Receivable Statute as amended, it is clearly unnecessary to
file a new notice when an assignment is made under a contract which
was concluded subsequent to the filing of a notice whose period of
effectiveness has not yet expired. Finally, the bill retains and states more
clearly the substantive rule adopted by the Ohio Assignment of Accounts
Receivable Statute that an assignment of rights which may arise under
a contract not in existence at the time of the assignment gives the assignee
no rights as against persons other than the assignor.'
17 The amendment to the Texas statute, supra note 12, and the amendments
to statutes of states other than Ohio, supra note 14, unlike the Ohio amendment,
seem to present a substantial problem of construction on this point. It is possible
to construe these amendments as having not merely met the immediate problem
presented by the Keeran and Vial decisions but as having also abolished the sub-
stantive rule that rights under future contracts are not presently assignable. This
possibility is created by the definition of "account receivable" in these amend-
ments as "an existing or future right to the payment of maney presently due, or
to become due . . . under an existing contract or under a future contract entered
into during the effective period of the notice of assignment." The term "future
contract" is, to say the least, not expressly limited to contracts which are entered
subsequent to the filing of the applicable notice and which are in existence at the
time of the assignment of rights arising under the contracts.
